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WHAT KIND OF ATHING IS A NUMBER?
ATalk With Reuben Hersh
Interviewer: John Brockman
New York City
Reben Hersh
University ofNew Mexico
Albuquerque, NM 87131
rhersh@math.unm.edu
"What is mathematics?It'sneither physical normental, it'ssocial. It'spart of culture, it's part of
history. It's like law, like religion, like money, like all those other things which are very real, but
onlyaspart of collective human consciousness....That's what math is. "
For mathematician Reuben Hersh, mathematics has
existence or reality on ly as part of human culture.
Despite its seeming timelessness and infallibility, it is
a socia l-cultural-historic phenomenon. He takes the
long view. He thinks a lot about the ancient problems.
What are numbers? What are triangles, squares and
circles? What are infinite sets? What is the fourth di-
mension? What is the meaning and nature of ma th-
ematics?
In so doing he explains and cri ticizes current and past
theories of the nature of mathematics. His main pur-
pose is to confront philosophical problems: In what
sense do mathematical objects exist? How can we have
knowledge of them? Why do mathematicians think
mathematical entities exist forever, independent of
human action and knowledge?
Reuben Hersh is professor emeritus at the University
of New Mexico, Albuquerque. He is the recipient (with
Martin Davis) of the Chauvenet Prize and (with Edgar
Lorch) the Ford Prize. Hersh is the author (with Philip
J. Davis) of The Mathematical Experience, winner of the
National Book Award in 1983. His new book, What is
Mathematics, Really? is forthcoming (Oxford ).
JOHN BROCKM AN: Reuben, got an interesting ques-
tion?
REUBEN HERSH: What is a number? Like, what is
two? Or even three? This is sort of a kindergarten ques-
tion, and of course a kindergarten kid would answer
like this: (raising three fingers). Or two (raising two
fingers) . That's a good answer and a bad answer. It's
good enough for most purposes, actually. But if you
ge t way beyond kindergarten, far enough to risk ask-
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ing really deep questions, it becomes: what kind of a
thing is a number?
Now, when you ask "What kind of a thing is a num-
ber?" you can think of two basic answers-either it's
out there some place, like a rock or a ghost; or it's in-
side, a thought in somebody's mind. Philosophers have
defended one or the other of those two answers. It's
really pathetic, because anybody who pays any at ten-
tion can see right away that they're both completely
wrong.
A number isn't a thing out there; there isn 't any place
that it is, or any thing that it is . Neither is it just a
thought, because after all, two and two is four, whether
you know it or not.
Then you realize that the question is not so easy, so
trivial as it sounds at first. One of the great philoso-
phers of mathematics, Gottlob Frege, made quite an
issue of the fact that mathematicians didn't know the
meaning of One. What is One? Nobody could answer
coherently. Of course Frege answered, but h is answer
was no better, or even worse, than the previous ones.
And so it has continued to this very day, strange and
incredible as it is. We know all about so much math-
ematics, but we don't know what it really is.
Of course when I say, "What is a number?" it applies
just as we ll to a triangle, or a circle, or a d ifferentiable
function, or a self-adjoint operator. You know a lot
about it, but what is it? What kind of a th ing is it? Any-
how, that's my question. A long answer to your short
question.
JB: And what's the answer to your question?
HERSH: Oh, you wa nt the answer so quick?Youhave
to work for the answer! I'll approach the answer by
gradual de grees.
When you say that a mathematical thing, object, en-
tity, is either completely external, independent of hu -
man thought or action, or else internal, a thought in
your mind- you're not just saying something about
numbers, but about existence-that there are only two
kinds of existence. Everything is either internal or ex-
ternal. And given that choice, that polarity or di-
chotomy, numbers don't fit-that's why it's a puzzle.
The question is made difficult by a false presupposi-
tion , that there are only two kinds of things around.
But if you pretend you 're not being philosophical, just
being real, and ask what there is around, well for in-
stance there's the traffic ticket you have to pay, there's
the news on the TV, there's a wedding you have to go
to, there's a bill you have to pay-none of these things
are just thoughts in your mind, and none of them is
external to human thought or activity. They are a dif-
ferent kind of reality, that's the trouble. This kind of
reality has been excluded from metaphysics and on-
tology, even though it's well-known-the sciences of
anthropology and sociology deal with it. But when you
become philosophical, somehow this third answer is
overlooked or rejected.
Now that I've set it up for you, you know what the
answer is. Mathematics is neither physical nor men -
tal, it 's social. It's part of cultu re, it's part of history, it's
like law, like religion, like money, like all those very
real things which are real onl y as part of collective
human consciousness. Being part of society and cul-
ture , it's both internal and external. Internal to society
and culture as a whole, external to the individual, who
has to learn it from books and in school. That's what
math is.
But for some Platonic mathematicians, that proposi-
tion is so outrageous that it takes a lot of effort even to
begin to consider it.
JB: Reuben, sounds like you're about to pu sh some
political agenda here, and it's not the Republican plat-
form.
HERSH: You 're saying my philosophy may be biased
by my politics. Well, it's true!This is one of the many
novel things in my book-looking into the correlation
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between political belief and belief about the nature of
mathematics.
JB: Do you have a name for this solution?
HERSH: I call it humanistic philosophy of mathemat-
ics. It's not really a school; no one else has jumped on
the bandwagon with that name, but there are other
people who think in a similar way, who gave it differ-
ent names. I'm not completely a lone wolf here, I'm
one of the mavericks, as we call them. The wolves bay-
ing outside the corral of philosophy.
Anyhow, back to your other question. The second half
of my book is about the history of the philosophy of
mathematics. I found that this was best explained by
separating philosophers of mathematics into two
groups. One group I call mainstream and the other I
call humanists and mavericks.The humanists and mav-
ericks see mathematics as a human activity, and the
mainstream see it as inhuman or superhuman. By the
way, there have been humanists way back; Aristotle
was one. I wondered whether there wa s any connec-
tion with politics. So I tried to classify each of these
guys as either right-wing or left-wing, in relation to
their own times. Plato wa s far right; Aristotle was
somewhat liberal. 5pinoza was a revolutionary;
Descartes was a royalist, and so on. These are well
known facts. There are some guys that you can't clas-
sify. It came out just as you are intimating: the human-
ists are predominantly left-wing and the mainstream
predominantly right wing.Any explanation would be
speculative, but intuitively it makes sense. For instance,
one main version of mainstream philosophy of math-
ematics is Platonism. It says that all mathematical ob-
jects, entities, or whatever, including the ones we
haven't discovered yet and the ones we never will dis-
cover-all of them have always existed. There's no
change in the realm of mathematics. We discover
things, our knowledge increases, but the actual math-
ematical universe is completely static. Always wa s,
always will be. Well, that's kind of conservative, you
know. Fits in with someone who th ink s that social in-
stitutions mustn't change.
So this parallel exists. But there are exceptions. For
instance, Bertrand Russell wa s a Platonist and a so-
cialist. One of my favorite philosophers, Imre Lakatos,
was a right-winger politically, but very radical philo-
sophically. These correlations are loose and statistical,
not binding. Youcan 't tell somebody's philosophy from
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his po litics, or vice versa.
I sea rched for a su itable label for my ideas. There were
several others tha t ha d been used for simil ar points of
view-social constructivism, fallibilism, qu asi-empiri-
cism , na tura lism . I d idn't want to take anybody else's
label, because I was blazing my own trail, and I didn't
want to label myself with someone else's school. The
name that would have been most accurate was social
concep tualism. Mathematics consists of concep ts, but
no t individually held concepts; socially held concepts.
Maybe I thought of humanism because I belong to a
group called the Humanistic Mathematics Network.
Humanism is app ropriate, because it 's saying that
math is something human. There's no math without
people. Many people think that ellipses and numbers
and so on are there whether or not any people know
about them; I think that's a confusion .
JB: Sounds like we're talk ing abou t an anthropic prin-
ciple of mathematics here.
HERSH: Maybe so; I never thought of tha t. I had a
serious argument with a friend of mine at the Univer-
sity of New Mexico, a philosopher of science. She said:
"There are nine planets; there were nine planets be-
fore there were any people. That means there was the
number nine, before we had any people."
There is a difficulty that has to be clarified. We do see
mathematical things, like small numbers, in physical
reality.And that seems to contradict the idea that num-
bers are social entities. The way to straighten this out
has been pointed out by others also. We use number
words in tw o different ways: as nouns and adjectives.
This is an important observation. We say nine apples,
nine is an adjective. If it's an objective fact that the re
are nine apples on the table, that's just as objective as
the fact that the apples are red, or that they're ripe, or
anything else about them, that's a fact. And there's re-
ally no special difficulty about that. Things become
difficult when we switch unconsciously, and carelessly,
between this real-world adjective interpretation of
math words like nine, and the pure abstraction that
we talk about in math class.
That's not reall y the same nine, although there's of
course a correlation and a connection. But the number
nine as an abstract object, as part of a number system,
is a human possession, a human creation, it doesn't
exist without us. The possible existence of collections
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of nine objects is a physical thing, which certainly ex-
ists without u s. The two kinds of nine are different.
Like I can say a plate is round, an objective fact, but
the conception of roundness, mathematical roundness,
is something else.
Sad to say, philosophy is definitely an op tiona l activ-
ity; most people, including mathematicians, don't even
know if they have a philosophy, or what their philoso-
phy is. Certainly what they do w ould not be affected
by a philosophical controversy. This is true in many
other fields. To be ,a practitioner is one thing; to be a
philosopher is another. To justify philosophical activ-
ity one must go to a deeper level , for instance as in
Socrates' remark about the un examined life. It 's pa-
thetic to be a mathematician all your life and never
worry, or think, or care, what that means. Many peopl e
do it. I compare this to a salmon swimming upstream.
He knows how to swim upstream, but he doesn't know
what he 's doing or why.
JB: How does having a philosophy of mathematics af-
fect its teaching?
HERSH: The philosophy of mathematics is ver y per-
tinent to the teaching of mathematics. What's wrong
with mathematics teaching is not particular to this
country. People are very critical about math teaching
in the United States nowadays, as if it was just an
American problem. But even though some other coun-
tries get higher test scores, the fundamental mis-teach-
ing and bad teaching of mathematics is international,
it 's standard. In some ways w e're not as bad as some
other countries. But I don't want to get into that right
now.
Let me state three possible philosophical attitudes to-
wards mathematics:
Platonism says mathematic s is about some ab stract
entities which are independent of humanity.
Formalism says mathematics is nothing but calcula-
tions. There's no meaning to it at all. You just come
out with the right answer by following the rules.
Humanism sees mathematics as part of human culture
and human history.
It 's hard to come to rigorous conclusions about this
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kind of thing , but I feel it 's almost obvious that
Platonism and formalism are anti-educational, and
interfere with understanding, and humanism at least
doesn't hurt and could be beneficial.
Formalism is connected with rote, the traditional
method which is still common in many parts of the
world. Here's an algorithm; practice it for a while; now
here's another one. That's certainly what makes a lot
of people hate mathematics. (I don't mean that math-
ematicians who are formalists advocate teaching by
rote. But the formalist conception of mathematics fits
naturally with the rote method of instruction.)
There are various kinds of Platonists. Some are good
teachers, some are bad. But the Platonist idea, that, as
my friend Phil Da vis puts it, pi is in the sky, helps to
make mathematics intimidating and remote, It can be
an excuse for a pupil's failure to learn, or for a teacher's
saying "some people just don't get it."
The humanistic philosophy brings mathematics down
to earth, makes it accessible psychologically, and in-
creases the likelihood that someone can learn it, be-
cause it's just one of the things that people do. This is
a matter of opinion; there's no data, no tests. But I'm
convinced it is the case.
JB: How do you teach humanistic math?
HERSH: I'm going to sidestep that sligh tly, I'll tell you
my conception of good math teaching. How this con-
nects with the philosophy may be more tenuous .
The essential thing is interaction, communication.Only
in math do you have this typical figure who was sup-
posedly exemplified by Norbert Wiener. He walks into
the classroom, doesn't look at the class, starts writing
on the board, keeps writing until the hour is over and
then departs, still without looking at the class.
A good math teacher star ts with examples. He first
asks the question and then gives the answer, instead
of giving the answer without mentioning what the
question was. He is alert to the body language and
eye movements of the class. If they start rolling their
eyes or leaning back, he will stop his proof or his cal-
cu lation and force them somehow to respond, even to
say "I don't get it." No math class is totally bad if the
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students are speaking up. And no math lecture is re-
ally good, no matter how beautiful, if it lets the audi-
ence become simply passive . Some of this applies to
any kind of teaching, but math unfortunate ly is con-
ducive to bad teaching.
It's so strange. Ma thematical theorems may really be
very useful. But nobody kn ows it. The tea cher doen't
mention it, the stu dents don 't kn ow it. All they know
is it's part of the course. That's inhuman, isn't it?
Here is an anecdote. I teach a class, which I invented
myself" called Problem Solving for High School and
Junior High School Teachers and Future Teachers. The
idea is to get them into problem sol ving, having fun at
it, feeling confident at it, in the hope that when they
become teachers they will impart some of tha t to their
class. The s tuden ts had assignments; they were sup-
posed to work on something and then come talk about
it in class. One day I called for volunteers. No volun-
teers. I waited. Waited. Then, feeling very brave , I went
to the back of the room and sat down and said noth-
ing. For a while. And another while. Then a student
went to the blackboard, and then another on e.
It turned ou t to be a very good class. The key was that
I was willing to shut up. The easy thing, which I had
done hundreds of times, would ha ve been to say,
"Okay, I'll show it to you." That's perhaps the biggest
difficulty for most, nearly all , teachers-not to talk so
much. Be quiet. Don't think the world's coming to an
end if there's silence for two or three minutes.
JB: Earlier you mentioned the word beauty. What' s
with beauty?
HERSH: Fortunately, I have an answer to that. My
friend, Clan-Carlo Rota, dealt with that issue in his
new book, Indiscrete Thoughts. He said the desire to
say "How beautiful!" is associated with an insigh t.
When someth ing unclear or confusing suddenly fits
together, that's beautiful. Ma ybe there are other situa-
tions that you would say are beautiful besides that,
but I felt when I read that that he really had some-
thing. Because we talk about beauty all the time with-
out being clear what we mean by it; it 's purely subjec-
tive, But Rota came very close to it. Order out of con-
fusion, simplicity out of complexity, understanding out
of misunderstanding-that's mathematical beauty.
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